A Fictionalist Account of Open-Label Placebo.

The placebo effect is now generally defined widely as an individual's response to the psychosocial context of a clinical treatment, as distinct from the treatment's characteristic physiological effects. Some researchers, however, argue that such a wide definition leads to confusion and misleading implications. In response, they propose a narrow definition restricted to the therapeutic effects of deliberate placebo treatments. Within the framework of modern medicine, such a scope currently leaves one viable placebo treatment paradigm: the non-deceptive and non-concealed administration of "placebo pills" or open-label placebo (OLP) treatment. In this paper, I consider how the placebo effect occurs in OLP. I argue that a traditional, belief-based account of OLP is paradoxical. Instead, I propose an account based on the non-doxastic attitude of pretence, understood within a fictionalist framework.

Rules, practices and principles: Putting bioethical principles in their place.

Bioethics seems preoccupied with establishing, debating, promoting and sometimes debunking principles. While these tasks trade on the status of the word 'principle' in our ordinary language, scant attention is paid to the way principles operate in language. In this paper, we explore how principles relate to rules and practices so as to better understand their logic. We argue that principles gain their sense and power from the practices which give them sense. While general principles can be, and are, establishable in abstraction from specific practices, as they are in principlist bioethics, such principles are impotent as moral guides to action. We show that the purchase any principle has as a moral guide to action emerges from its indexical properties as a principle which has sense in a specific practice. The meaning of any principle is internal to the practice and context in which it is invoked and, therefore, principles are not kinds of master rule which dictate moral judgement in new contexts but rather chameleon-like rules which change with the contexture in which they are invoked.

Whose models? Which representations? A response to Wagner.

In Where the Ethical Action Is, we argued that medical and ethical modes of thought are not different in kind but different aspects of a situation. One of the consequences of this argument is that the requirement for or benefits of normative moral theorising in bioethics is undercut. In response, Wagner has argued that normative moral theories should be reconceived as models. Wagner's argument seems to be that once reconceived as models, the rationale for moral theorising, undercut by our arguments in Where the Ethical Action Is, will be re-established because we will see those moral-theories-now-rebranded-as-models as serving a role akin to the role models serve in some of the natural sciences. In this response to Wagner, we provide two arguments against Wagner's proposal. We call these arguments the Turner-Cicourel Challenge and the Question Begging Challenge.

Unintentional deception still deceives.

In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.

Pretending to care.

On one hand, it is commonly accepted that clinicians should not deceive their patients, yet on the other there are many instances in which deception could be in a patient's best interest. In this paper, I propose that this conflict is in part driven by a narrow conception of deception as contingent on belief. I argue that we cannot equate non-deceptive care solely with introducing or sustaining a patient's true belief about their condition or treatment, because there are many instances of clinical care which are non-doxastic and non-deceptive. Inasmuch as this is true, better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and pretence, could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice.

Three Simple Rules for Good Cognitive Science.

There is much recent concern about whether cognitive science is a cohesive discipline. In response, I propose that although cognitive science necessarily lacks conceptual or methodological cohesion, it can have dispositional cohesion. I further propose that this can be achieved by following three simple rules.

Where the ethical action is.

It is common to think of medical and ethical modes of thought as different in kind. In such terms, some clinical situations are made more complicated by an additional ethical component. Against this picture, we propose that medical and ethical modes of thought are not different in kind, but merely different aspects of what it means to be human. We further propose that clinicians are uniquely positioned to synthesise these two aspects without prior knowledge of philosophical ethics.

Cultivating the dispositions to connect: an exploration of therapeutic empathy.

Empathy is a broad concept that involves the various ways in which we come to know and make connections with one another. As medical practice becomes progressively orientated towards a model of engaged partnership, empathy is increasingly important in healthcare. This is often conceived more specifically through the concept of therapeutic empathy, which has two aspects: interpersonal understanding and caring action. The question of how we make connections with one another was also central to the work of the novelist E.M. Forster. In this article we analyse Forster's interpretation of connection-particularly in the novel Howards End-in order to explore and advance current debates on therapeutic empathy. We argue that Forster conceived of connection as a socially embedded act, reminding us that we need to consider how social structures, cultural norms and institutional constraints serve to affect interpersonal connections. From this, we develop a dispositional account of therapeutic empathy in which connection is conceived as neither an instinctive occurrence nor a process of representational inference, but a dynamic process of embodied, embedded and actively engaged enquiry. Our account also suggests that therapeutic empathy is not merely an untrainable reflex but something that can be cultivated. We thus promote two key ideas. First, that empathy should be considered as much a social as an individual phenomenon, and second that empathy training can and should be given to clinicians.

Subjunctive medicine: A manifesto.

Despite the manifest advantages of modern medicine, many aspects of the experience of illness and healing are not reducible to bodily dysfunction and its restoration. Clinicians and researchers now largely understand that medical practice needs to accommodate a dual aspectivity of the physical body and the lived body. This is increasingly operationalised through the framework of person-centred care, focussed on initiating, integrating, and safeguarding the partnership between the patient-as-person and the clinician-as-person, informed by a narrative perspective on selfhood. In this manifesto, we develop the narrative focus of person-centred care into an alternative framework for medical practice - subjunctive medicine - grounded in ritual efficacy and an explicit appeal to the imagination. We argue that the healing effects of a clinical encounter are reliant on the subjunctive co-construction of a temporary shared social world for a particular purpose. More explicit awareness of the subjunctive nature of the clinical encounter may expand clinicians' opportunities for healing, whilst fostering resilience. We further suggest that, to be fully actualised, subjunctive medicine requires a shift towards conscious appreciation of the nature of subjunctivity at the social level; a social reawakening to the power of the imagination in modern medicine.

From substance to process: A meta-ethnographic review of how healthcare professionals and patients understand placebos and their effects in primary care.

Research suggests that a 'placebo' can improve conditions common in primary care including pain, depression and irritable bowel syndrome. However, disagreement persists over the definition and clinical relevance of placebo treatments. We conducted a meta-ethnographic, mixed-research systematic review to explore how healthcare professionals and patients understand placebos and their effects in primary care. We conducted systematic literature searches of five databases - augmented by reference chaining, key author searches and expert opinion - related to views on placebos, placebo effects and placebo use in primary care. From a total of 34 eligible quantitative, qualitative and mixed-methods articles reporting findings from 28 studies, 21 were related to healthcare professionals' views, 11 were related to patients' views and two were related to both groups. In the studies under review, healthcare professionals reported using placebos at markedly different frequencies. This was highly influenced by how placebos were defined in the studies. Both healthcare professionals and patients predominantly defined placebos as material substances such as 'inert' pills, despite this definition being inconsistent with current scientific thinking. However, healthcare professionals also, but less prevalently, defined placebos in a different way: as contextual processes. This better concurs with modern placebo definitions, which focus on context, ritual, meaning and enactivism. However, given the enduring ubiquity of substance definitions, for both healthcare professionals and patients, we question the practical, clinical validity of stretching the term 'placebo' towards its modern iteration. To produce 'placebo effects', therefore, primary healthcare professionals may be better off abandoning placebo terminology altogether.

Subjunctive medicine: Enacting efficacy in general practice.

Modern general practice is complex. Issues such as multimorbidity, polypharmacy and chronic illness management can make applying myriad single condition evidence-based guidelines increasingly difficult. This is compounded because the problems presented in general practice often require both clinical and social solutions. In response to these issues, generalist clinicians are now expected to practise 'person-centred care': enabling and empowering patients by combining the technical rationality of medical science with individual values, needs and preferences. To explore this difficult undertaking we conducted an ethnography of a general practice surgery in England, including participant observation, interviews, and focus groups with patients, clinicians, and support staff, from February 2018 to March 2019. Our findings suggest that clinicians in our study faced considerable constraints, broadly conceived as the limits of biomedicine and the structural constraints of general practice. However, they mitigated these by getting into good habits, which we conceive in two categories: using expert judgement and taking patients seriously. We further propose that clinicians did not merely will themselves towards these good habits but developed and adapted them by intuitively adopting a second-order 'meta' habit of enaction - treating each consultation as collaboratively co-created anew. This suggests an important feature of the general practice consultation: it is conducted as much in the subjunctive as the indicative mood. Developing this proposition, we propose a more general form of medical practice - subjunctive medicine - extolling the value of the co-created social order of the general practice consultation itself. We suggest that practising subjunctive medicine may help clinicians sustainably and resiliently achieve the aims of person-centred care in modern general practice.

A discursive exploration of public perspectives on placebos and their effects.

There is increasing evidence that placebos could be effective in clinical practice. However, knowledge of public perspectives on placebos is underdeveloped. We conducted a discourse analysis of internet comments on news articles related to placebos, aiming to improve this knowledge for clinicians and researchers. We developed two discursive constructs of the placebo. The dominant construct of the 'placebo pill' informs a paradoxical understanding of placebos that closes down treatment. The less-prevalent counter-discursive construct of the 'treatment process' frames placebos as potentially viable within modern evidence-based medicine. We discuss the opportunities and challenges of this alternative understanding of placebos.